All issues · Democracy & Civil Liberties · No. 23

Privacy and Surveillance

How much visibility into private life should security and commerce be allowed to purchase?

Government surveillance authorities and commercial data collection have grown alongside digital life. The US has no comprehensive federal privacy law, leaving a patchwork of sectoral rules and state statutes.

Foreign intelligence surveillance authorities permit collection targeting non-citizens abroad, which incidentally captures communications of Americans in contact with them. The rules for querying that incidental collection are a recurring point of dispute.

Commercial data brokers assemble detailed profiles from purchases, location, and browsing. Government agencies have in some cases purchased data they would otherwise need legal process to obtain, which critics describe as a workaround.

Encryption protects communications from interception but limits lawful access even with a warrant. Proposals for guaranteed access face the technical objection that a vulnerability created for one party is available to any party who finds it.

The positionsFind your officials →

POSITION 1 / 3

Stronger privacy protection

Pervasive collection chills lawful behavior and creates records that will eventually be misused.

Location histories reveal medical, religious, and political associations.
Purchasing data should not let agencies bypass warrant requirements.
Data retained is data that will eventually breach or leak.
People cannot meaningfully consent through terms of service they do not read.

POSITION 2 / 3

Security and lawful access

Investigators need tools proportionate to genuine threats, and warrant-proof spaces have real costs.

Surveillance authorities have contributed to disrupting plots and identifying networks.
Encryption can prevent access to evidence in serious criminal cases.
Oversight exists through courts and legislative committees.
Adversary states conduct extensive collection regardless of US restraint.

POSITION 3 / 3

Comprehensive data rules

The commercial side is the larger and less examined problem, and it needs baseline federal rules.

Data minimization limits exposure by limiting collection at the source.
Rights to access, correct, and delete personal data are standard in other jurisdictions.
A federal standard would replace an inconsistent patchwork of state laws.
Sensitive categories such as health, location, and biometrics warrant specific rules.

Terms you will hearFind your officials →

Section 702: Authority for foreign intelligence collection that incidentally captures some domestic communications.
Data broker: A company assembling and selling personal information about individuals.
End-to-end encryption: Encryption where only the communicating parties can read the content.
Data minimization: Collecting and retaining only what is necessary for a stated purpose.

What people actually disagree aboutFind your officials →

Should agencies be able to purchase data they would need a warrant to compel?
Is there a technical way to give lawful access without creating general vulnerability?
Does consent through terms of service mean anything in practice?

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